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1 Notation
g(x) Performance (limit state) function
Cij Consequences of the events Eij
Ctot Total expected cost
Eij Events
Hi Hazard situation i
H1 Hazard situation under normal conditions
H2 Hazard situation due to fire
P(F|Hi) Probability of failure F given the situation Hi
pF Probability of failure F
pd Target probability of failure
pf Probability P(F|H2) of structural failure during fire
pfi, s Probability of fire start P(H2)
pfi, d Conditional probabilities of fire flashover given H2
pfi Probability of fire flashover
pt, fi Target probability of structural failure under fire
design situation
x Generic point of the vector of basic variables.
X Vector of basic variables
 Reliability index
X(x) Probability density function of the vector of basic
variables X
X(x) Distribution function of the vector of basic vari-
ables X
2 Introduction
Design and assessment of civil structures suffer from
a number of uncertainties, which can hardly be described by
available theoretical tools. According to Thoft-Christensen
and Baker [1], Melchers [2] and Holický [3] these uncertain-
ties include:
• natural randomness of basic variables,
• statistical uncertainties caused by a limited size of available
data,
• model uncertainties caused by deficiencies of computa-
tional models,
• uncertainties caused by inaccuracy in definitions of limit
states,
• gross errors caused by human faults,
• lack of understanding of actual behaviour of materials and
structures.
These uncertainties are listed in the order corresponding
to their increasing effect on the frequency of failures and the
decreasing possibility of describing them theoretically. Tradi-
tional probability methods usually deal with the first three
types of uncertainties only. It was shown by Holický [3] that
the fourth type of uncertainty can be partly described using
the theory of fuzzy sets. Theoretical tools for the description
of gross errors are insufficient (as indicated by Melchers [2]),
while no tools are available to describe the lack of understand-
ing of the actual behaviour of new materials and structures.
The available theoretical tools obviously have a limited capa-
bility of describing all types of uncertainties. This adverse
reality corresponds to the observed proportions of failure
causes, for which informative values are indicated in Table 1
(obtained from the data provided by Melchers [2], Stewart
and Melchers [4] and other publications quoted in these
references).
The first line in Table 1 indicates the proportions of vari-
ous origins of structural failures chosen from basic activities
during the construction and service-life of structures. The sec-
ond line indicates relations between these activities and two
main causes: gross errors (about 80 %) due to human activity
and environmental effects (about 20 %), which are not directly
dependent on human activity.
Environmental influences include both random and haz-
ard (accidental) situations, e.g. due to impact, explosion,
fire and extreme climatic actions. Thus, natural randomness
causes only a small proportion of the failures (about 10 %).
Obviously, further development of more precise procedures
based on the traditional probabilistic approach (the basis
of which is mentioned in the following section) has only
a limited significance. Advanced engineering design methods
8 ©  Czech Technical University Publishing House http://ctn.cvut.cz/ap/
Acta Polytechnica Vol. 41  No. 4–5/2001
Prospects for Advanced Engineering
Design Based on Risk Assessment
M. Holický
Current approaches to the design of structures are based on the concept of target probability of failure. This value is, however, often specified
on the basis of comparative studies and past experience only. Moreover, the traditional probabilistic approach cannot properly consider gross
errors and accidental situations, both of which are becoming more frequent causes of failure. This paper shows that it is useful to supplement
a probabilistic design procedure by a risk analysis and assessment, which can take into account the consequences of all unfavourable events.
It is anticipated that in the near future advanced engineering design will include criteria of acceptable risks in addition to the traditional
probabilistic conditions.
Keywords: reliability, hazard situations, adverse events, costs, risk assessment, Bayessian network, advanced engineering design.
Origin Design Execution Use Other
20 % 50 % 15 % 15 %
Causes Gross errors due
to human activity
Environmental effects
80 % 20 %
Table 1: The proportions of causes of structural failures
should therefore attempt to consider the actual causes of
failures.
3 The probabilistic method
The probabilistic method of designing structures assumes
that a failure F of the structure is unequivocally described by
inequality g(x) < 0, where g(x) denotes the limit state func-
tion (g(x) = 0 describes the limit state, g(x) > 0 the safe state),
x is a realisation of the vector of basic variables X. If X(x) in-
dicates the joint probability density of the vector of the basic
variables X, the probability of failure pF can be determined
from the relation
 
 
pF
x


X x x
g
d
0
. (1)
The reliability index  is formally defined on the basis of
the probability pF using the relation pF = (), where  is the
distribution function of the standardised normal distribution.
Calculation of the probability of failure pF using equation (1)
suffers from two essential deficiencies, as demonstrated by
Ellingwood [5]:
• uncertainty in the definition of the limit state function g(x),
• uncertainties in theoretical models describing the basic
variables X.
These deficiencies are most likely the main sources of the
observed discrepancy between the determined probability pF
and the actual frequency of failures. That is why quantities pF
and  are often referred to as „formal“ (notional) reliability
indicators (associated with the intention to standardise theo-
retical models of basic variables). However, such an approach
jeopardises the nature of probabilistic concepts including the
methods of probabilistic optimisation, which should provide
the target probability of failure pd used in the design condition
pF < pd. In order to increase the significance of probabilistic
concepts a considerable effort focussed on improving the the-
oretical models describing basic variables and on extending of
the traditional probabilistic concepts by risk assessment meth-
ods has recently been observed by Stewart and Melchers [4]
and Ellingwood [5].
4 The concept of acceptable risk
The risk assessment of a system attempts to cover all possi-
ble events that might lead to unfavourable effects related to
the considered system. As mentioned above, these events are
caused mainly by gross errors in human activity and by acci-
dental actions such as impact, explosion, fire and extreme
climatic loads. Adequate situations (hazard scenarios and
common design situations), designated generally as Hi, will
occur with the probability P(Hi). If the failure of structure F
due to a particular situation Hi occurs with the conditional
probability P(F|Hi), then the total probability of failure pF is
given as:
   p F H HF i
i
iP P . (2)
The conditional probabilities P(F|Hi) must be determined
by a separate analysis of the respective situations Hi. Equation
(2) can be used for harmonisation of the partial probabilities
of failure P(F|Hi) P(Hi) corresponding to the situations Hi,
and for the following risk consideration.
In general, the situations Hi may cause a number of unfa-
vourable events Eij (e.g. excessive deformations, full develop-
ment of the fire). It is assumed that the adverse consequences
of these events can be expressed by a one-component quantity
Cij (for example, by the cost expressed in a certain currency).
It is further assumed that the consequences Cij are mutually
uniquely related to the events Eij. Then the total risk C related
to the considered situations Hi is the sum
   C C E H Hij ij i i
ij
 P P . (3)
It is sometimes necessary to describe the consequences of
an unfavourable phenomenon Eij by a quantity having several
components, denoted as Cij, k (describing for example cost,
injuries or casualties). The components Ck of the resultant
risk are then given as
   C C E H Hk ij k ij i i
ij
 , P P . (4)
If it is possible to specify the acceptable limit Ck, d for
the components Ck, it is possible to design the structure on
the basis of the condition of acceptable risks Ck < Ck, d that
supplements the probability condition pf < pd.
5 Example of a structure under a fire
situation
An example illustrating the concept of acceptable risks
concerns a structure for which only two different situations
are considered:
• H1 persistent design situation, for which P(H1) = 0.99
is assumed,
• H2 accidental situation during the fire, for which
P(H2) = 0.01 is assumed.
The persistent situation H1 is analysed using the tradi-
tional probabilistic reliability analysis. An example of an
analysis of situation H2 is indicated in Figure 1, which shows
a Bayesian network describing the structure during a fire.
The chance, decision and utility nodes indicated in Fig-
ure 1 are briefly described below. A more detailed description
is given by Holický and Schleich [6]. An alternative type of
network and analysis was recently provided by Holický and
Schleich [7].
1 – Fire starts. The parentless chance node describing the
initiation of a fire. The probability pfi, s= P(H2) = 0.01 is
assumed for the positive state (fire starts) considering
an office compartment of 25 m2 during its design life of
50 years.
2 – Detection by occupants. The chance node describing the
detection of smoke by occupants or neighbours within
a suitable time period. The conditional probability 0.9
given the fire started (parent node 1) is considered.
3 – Occupancy. The chance node describing the activity of
the occupants of the building to diminish the fire. The
conditional probabilities related to the states of parent
nodes 2 and 6 are given by Holický and Schleich [6].
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4 – Tampering. This parentless chance node describes the
interference of random factors with the automatic fire
detection system (node 5). The probability 0.02 is con-
sidered for the disturbing effects on the detection
system.
5 – Smoke detection. The chance node describing the oper-
ation of an automatic smoke detection system. The
conditional probabilities related to parent nodes 1 and 4
are given by Holický and Schleich [6].
6 – Alarm. The chance node describing the operation of an
acoustic fire alarm system. The conditional probabilities
related to the states of parent nodes 2, 5 and 8 are con-
sidered in accordance with Holický and Schleich [6].
7 – Tampering. The parentless chance node describing the
interference of random factors with the automatic sprin-
kler system (node 5). The probability 0.02 is considered
for the disturbing effects on the sprinkler system.
8 – Sprinklers. The chance node describing the operation
of the automatic sprinkler system (if installed). The con-
ditional probabilities related to the states of parent
nodes 1 and 7 are indicated by Holický and Schleich [6].
9 – Transmission. The chance node describing the opera-
tion of manual or automatic alarm transmission to the
fire brigade. The conditional probabilities related to the
states of parent nodes 2, 5 and 8 are given by Holický
and Schleich [6].
10 – Fire brigade. The chance node describing the operation
of a professional fire brigade. The conditional prob-
ability 0.9 that the fire brigade is active when the alarm
(parent node 9) goes off is considered.
11 – Flashover. The chance node describing the develop-
ment of the fire. The conditional probabilities related to
the states of parent nodes 1, 3, 8 and 10 are given by
Holický and Schleich [6].
12 – Collapse. The chance node describing structural col-
lapse under the fire design situation in the case of fire
flashover. The conditional probability 0.2 of structural
collapse given the fire flashover is considered in the
example.
13 – Protection. The parentless decision node describing the
resolution concerning protection of the structural
against fire. The node has two states: ‘yes’ and ‘no’. As
indicated by Holický and Schleich[6] for the state “no”
the child node 12-Collapse has greater probability of a
positive state than for the positive decision “yes” con-
cerning structural protection.
14 – Cost. The utility node describing the cost C14(13) of
structural protection (affecting node 12), which depends
on the state of node 13. The relative value 10 expressed
in monetary units is considered if the decision (node 13)
is positive.
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11-Flashover
8-Sprinklers5-Smoke det.2-Det. by occ.
1-Fire starts
4-Tampering
6-Alarm
10-Fire brigade
7-Tampering
3-Occupancy
14-Cost
16-Cost
15-Cost
9-Transmission
12-Collapse 17-Cost
13-Protection
Fig. 1: An example of the Bayesian belief network representing a fire situation
15 – Cost. The utility node describing the damage cost C15(8,
10, 11) caused by the sprinklers (node 8) and the fire
brigade (node 10) if the fire (node 11) does not flash-
over. The relative costs expressed in the same monetary
unit as cost C14(13) are indicated by Holický and
Schleich [6]. If the fire develops fully (node 11), these
costs are covered by utility node 16.
16 – Cost. The utility node describing the damage cost
C16(11, 12) assuming that the fire flashover occurred.
The relative value of 100 units expressed in the same
monetary units as the costs C14(13) and C15(8, 10, 11)
is assumed.
17 – Cost. The utility node describing the damage cost
C17(12) due to the collapse of the structure (node 12).
Relative values of the cost C17(12) from 10
5 to 108 are
considered in the example.
Assuming the independence of the two situations H1 and
H2, it holds that P(H1) + P(H2) = 1. If P(F|H1) = 10
5 (which
is an expected value) and P(F|H2) = 10
3, then the probabil-
ity of failure is according to relation (2)
       p F H H F H HF   	 
 P P P P1 1 2 2 52 10 . (5)
Further it is assumed that the following events, the first of
which are related to situation H1, and the other to H2, may
occur:
• E11 structural failure due to exceeding the ultimate limit
state,
• E12 unacceptable deformations, i.e. exceeding the limit
state of serviceability,
• E21 activation of sprinklers (Figure 1 – chance node 8),
• E22 intervention of a fire brigade (Figure 1 – chance
node 10),
• E23 full development of fire (Figure 1 – chance node 11),
• E24 structural failure due to fire (Figure 1 – chance
node 12).
The conditional probabilities P(Eij|Hi) can generally be
determined on the basis of a detailed probabilistic analysis of
the two situations H1 and H2.
Assuming that unfavourable consequences are given by
quantities Cij or Cij, k corresponding to an unfavourable phe-
nomenon Eij, equations (3) and (4) may be applied to de-
termine the total risk C or its components Ck. Note that
the unfavourable consequences C21, C22, C23 and C24 are
described in Figure 1 by utility nodes 15, 16 and 17. The
total expected cost Ctot can then be given by a simplified
equation (3) as a sum
       C C C C p Ctot f    
14 15 16 1713 8 10 11 11 12 12, , , (6)
where, as described above, C14(13) is the cost depending on
the state of node 13, C15(8, 10, 11) is the damage cost depend-
ing on the states of nodes 8, 10 and 11, and C16(11, 12) is the
cost due to flashover depending on the state of nodes 11 and
12. The last term in the sum pf × C17(12) is the expected cost
due to structural failure (collapse), where pf is the probability
of failure and C17(12) is the damage cost given the failure.
The damage cost C17(12) is a complex quantity, which is
dependent on many factors including the cost of the structure
and other costs due to structural malfunctioning.
6 Probabilistic analysis
The Bayesian network was analysed using the program
HUGIN 1999. The resulting probabilities pfi of fire flashover,
the conditional probabilities pfi, d, and the probabilities of
structural failure pf are shown in Table 2.
The probability pfi of fire flashover (0.00013) obtained by
the probabilistic analysis of the network seems to be relative-
ly low. Note, however, that this value is valid for the fire
start probability pfi, s = P(H2) = 0.01 (corresponding to a small
compartment area A = 25 m2 and a 50 year time period),
which is linearly dependent on compartment area A. Thus,
the input probability pfi, s may be much greater than 0.01.
If, for example, the compartment area is ten times greater
(250 m2), then pfi, s= 0.1 and the probabilities pfi will also be
ten times greater than the values indicated in Table 2. The
conditional probability pfi, d that the fire, once started, will de-
velop fully (shown in the second line of Table 2), is relatively
low primarily due to the relatively high efficiency of the sprin-
klers considered by Holický and Schleich [6].
Table 2 also shows that the probability of structural failure
may be decreased using the appropriate structural protection.
However, the data given in Table 2 depend on input condi-
tional probabilities, which should be determined on the basis
of a detailed probabilistic analysis, taking into account the
actual protection measures. Having the probability of fire
flashover pfi, it is now possible to specify the target probabili-
ties pt, fi of structural failure under the fire design situation
using equation (2). Obviously with increasing probability of
fire flashover pfi the probability pt, fi decreases. As pfi is depend-
ent on compartment area A, the probabilities pt, fi are also
dependent on A. Detailed discussion is provided by Holický
and Schleich [6].
For large compartment areas A, the target probability pt, fi
of structural failure under the fire design situation will be very
small and, consequently, it may be difficult (if not impossible)
to design the structure under this condition. In such a case,
it may be necessary to use additional elements of the fire pro-
tection system in order to decrease the probability of fire
flashover pfi. It appears that the Bayesian network may effec-
tively be used to model a fire protection system and, possibly,
to find the optimum arrangement. For this purpose decision
and utility nodes often supplement a Bayesian network like
that in Figure 1.
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Decision concerning
protection
Yes No
Probabilities of fire flashover pfi
assuming P(H2) = 0.01
0.00013
Conditional probabilities pfi, d of
fire flashover given H2
0.013
Probability of structural failure
during the fire pf = P(F|H2)
1.0 × 105 3.6 × 105
Table 2: Probabilities of fire flashover pfi and conditional proba-
bilities pfi, d
7 Analysis of an influence diagram
In order to perform the risk assessment under a fire
design situation the Bayesian causal network in Figure 1 is
supplemented by decision node 13 and four utility nodes 14,
15, 16 and 17. The purpose of the influence diagram in Fig-
ure 1 is to analyse the expected total cost Ctot given by equa-
tion (6). The total expected cost Ctot is dependent on the
assumed probability of fire start pfi, s = P(H2). Figure 2 shows
the total cost Ctot as a function of the cost C17(12). It follows
from Figure 2 that for the cost C17(12) up to about 5 × 10
5
(expressed in relative monetary units), the structural protec-
tion seems to be uneconomical. However for the cost C17(12)
greater than 5 × 105 the expected total cost could be consid-
erably lower when the structural protection is provided.
It should be noted that the critical value of the cost C17(12)
for which the costs both with and without structural pro-
tection are equal depends on the probability of fire start
pfi, s = 0.01; with increasing pfi, s the critical value decreases
approximately by the same order.
8 Concluding remarks
The traditional probabilistic approach to engineering de-
sign covers only a small part of actual causes of structural fail-
ures. A significant proportion of all failures, besides gross
errors, is related to hazard scenarios (e.g. fire, impact, and
explosion), which are not usually included in the traditional
probabilistic analysis. For this reason, specification of the
design probability of failure remains an open question (how
safe is safe enough?).
The methods of risk analysis and assessment are capable
of encompassing more types of uncertainties than the tradi-
tional probabilistic approaches, and can significantly contrib-
ute to further improvement of advanced engineering design.
The remarkable fact that the public is better prepared to
accept certain risks than to stand for specified probabilities of
failure will make the application of risk assessment easier. It is
therefore anticipated that in the near future the probabilistic
methods of structural design will be supplemented by the
criteria of acceptable risks.
The above results should be considered as examples valid
for the assumed input data only. These data were assessed
here without due regard to specific technological and eco-
nomic conditions, which should be considered in the fire
safety assessment of a particular structure. Further research is
needed to specify a more detailed Bayesian network and the
appropriate input conditional probabilities. In particular, cost
distribution depending on the states of the parent nodes
should be investigated. Nevertheless, available experience
indicates that the Bayesian belief network provides a very
logical and effective tool for analysing the probability of fire
flashover for particular fire protection conditions.
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